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Introduction  
 
Radical Islamist terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Russia. The threat of radicalized 
individuals committing (suicide) attacks on behalf of terrorist organizations could be observed 
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Abstract 
The growing influence of the terror organization “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” 
(ISIS) on Russian speaking communities has come to fruition in the North Caucasus. 
ISIS has not only managed to attract individuals from the North Caucasus to join the 
jihad in Syria and Iraq, but further to establish the regional branch “Wilayat al-
Qawkaz”. Now, as a major international event in Russia 2018, the FIFA World Cup 
poses an attractive target for ISIS that has been threatened through ISIS’s online 
channels. In order to reach different target groups, ISIS has produced several high-
quality propaganda videos. According to Benford and Snow (2000), social movements 
perceive social phenomena differently and communicate their interpretation of reality 
by using frames. To sustain or increase the number of followers, ISIS spreads a 
narrative that identifies problems, proposes solutions and offers incentives to join. 
Benford and Snow describe this pattern as the three frame dimensions: diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational frame. This research paper aims to highlight the strategies 
of ISIS's propaganda videos in the North Caucasus by identifying the main topics 
within the three frame dimensions. Based on the analysis of five propaganda videos, it 
points out the main frames addressing the oppression of Muslims as the problem, jihad 
as the solution, religious duty and rewards in this world and the next as the incentives. 
Considering that persuasion of propaganda is only effective with credible frames, it 
can be observed that this requires references to real events and more important the use 
of reputable speakers that can be religious or militant leaders, as well as ordinary but 
authentic jihadists. Taking the visual frame analysis into account, the visualization of 
violence and community plays a huge role to create credibility, offer identity and to 
claim relevance as a serious opponent. 
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in contemporary Russian history in several regions across the country. The growing influence 
of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) in countries of the former Soviet Union and its 
propaganda for jihad has come to fruition, causing many casualties in recent attacks. ISIS did 
not only manage to attract foreign fighters for its causes in Syria in Iraq, but was also able to 
install branches around the world. The establishment of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz, the North 
Caucasian branch of ISIS, is only one of them. The explosions in St. Petersburg in 2017, the 
bombing attack in Dagestan and a shooting in Nizhny Novgorod against security forces in 
2016 were either considered by authorities to have a radical Islamist background or claimed 
by ISIS itself (see Lister et al. 2017; The Independent 2017; Zeit Online 2016; Kireev 2017). 
The upcoming events of the FIFA World Cup 2018 in Russia pose an attractive target for 
ISIS, which wants to make sure to attract international attention by creating the most possible 
damage. In fact, ISIS has already announced on affiliated media websites to commit attacks 
targeting the World Cup (see Payne 2017).  
In order to carry out the threats, ISIS has to mobilize, recruit and radicalize new 
adherents. As one of the recruitment strategies, ISIS has been using new media technology 
and online channels to spread its ideology, for example by producing high-quality propaganda 
videos. This research paper aims to highlight the characteristics and strategies of ISIS's 
propaganda videos in the North Caucasus by identifying the main topics and interpretative 
frameworks. According to Benford and Snow (2000), social movements perceive social 
phenomena differently and communicate their interpretation of reality by using frames. In 
order to sustain or increase the number of followers, ISIS spreads a narrative that identifies 
problems, proposes solutions and offers incentives to join. Benford and Snow describe this 
pattern as the three frame dimensions; the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frame 
which can facilitate in this context the categorization of ISIS’s propaganda content. 
The frame analysis is based on five Russian-speaking videos that were produced and 
published by Wilayat al-Qawkaz between 2015 and end of 2016. Taking into account the 
current state of research and prior review of the primary sources, themes which occurred as 
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the most relevant ones in the propaganda of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz will be analyzed within 
the frame analysis. Since ISIS needs to legitimatize its actions and existence in general, the 
discrimination and oppression of Muslims worldwide is a useful starting point and is 
communicated by ISIS as the main problem, the diagnostic frame. In this analysis, it will be 
called the “oppression frame”. The narrative continues with the “jihad frame” (prognostic 
frame) since joining the jihad and fighting against “unbelievers” is considered by ISIS to be 
the solution or the path to the solution. Finally, the motivational frame is divided into the duty 
and reward frame while the duty frame seems to be significantly important as a push factor. 
Duty means especially the religious obligation for every Muslim to join the jihad and ISIS. 
The reward frame focuses on benefits that ISIS offers to potential recruits.  
Since propaganda videos are the primary source of the analysis, the theoretical 
background is linked to the visual frame analysis. The striking use of contradictory images led 
to the consequence to take the violence frame and the community frame into account. The 
visualization of violence and community plays a huge role to create credibility, offer identity 
and to claim relevance as a serious opponent. Considering that persuasion of propaganda is 
only effective with credible frames, it can be observed that this requires references to real 
events and more important the use of reputable speakers that can be religious or militant 
leaders, as well as ordinary but authentic jihadists. Overall, the analysis shows the 
professional character of ISIS's propaganda videos with the main goals of recruiting 
adherents, threatening the world of “unbelievers” and occasionally updating other jihadist 
groups about the current situation in the North Caucasus.  
First of all, this research paper intends to highlight the developments leading to the 
successful circulation of radical Islamist ideas in the North Caucasus. The reconstruction of 
historical events and consideration of local features will expose the pathway to the 
establishment of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz while analyzing the influence of ISIS’s propaganda 
on North Caucasian fighters. This includes summarizing the existing information about North 
Caucasians fighting for ISIS in Syria and Iraq as well as the activities and strategies of the 
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local branch. The focus of this analysis also helps to explain the relevance of ISIS's 
propaganda videos and the particular frames. This requires outlining the theoretical 
background that is mainly based on the frame theory by Benford and Snow (2000). Based on 
their assumptions, publications dealing specifically with radical Islamist propaganda and 
reference to the work of Benford and Snow will be introduced. Especially the publications by 
Theine (2016) and Bernhardt (2016) had an impact on the methodological approach of this 
research paper. The transparent insight into the data selection, the categorization and 
operationalization of the frames as well as the benefits of a qualitative content analysis will be 
provided. The main part of the research paper will focus on the results of the frame analysis 
by examining the content, strategy and aim of every frame. The findings will give an 
overview about the variety of propaganda videos in the North Caucasus and explain the 
specific topics based on the local agenda. 
 
The Pathway to ISIS in the North Caucasus 
 
While ISIS has managed to recruit adherents all around the world, the organization also found 
fertile ground in the North Caucasus to establish one of its branches abroad. Radical Islam 
cannot be considered a new phenomenon in that region. The border opening after the fall of 
the Soviet Union enabled the appearance of new radical Islamic ideas, mainly from the 
Middle East, but also decades-long internal debates over the characteristics of Islam led to the 
dissemination of Wahhabism-Salafism (see Yarlykapov 2010: 138). The ideological basis of 
Wahhabism-Salafism is the idea of monotheism and the strict interpretation and 
implementation of the Qu’ran and the Sunna. Wahhabi-Salafis do not accept other viewpoints 
and consider Muslims who do not agree with them to be unbelievers. The jihad as the fight 
against unbelievers and alleged enemies of Islam is regarded to be compulsory for every 
Muslim and one of the main objectives of Wahhabism (see Yarlykapov 2010: 147f.). Even 
though the narratives of insurgent groups during the first Chechen War were primarily 
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dominated by secular national ideas, religious elements were added to the rhetoric because it 
helped to mobilize and provide an ideological basis for the movement. After the end of the 
Chechen War in 1996, a chaotic political, economic and social situation emerged. The local 
population was left alone with a disastrous economy, corruption and rising criminality (see 
Yemelianova 2001: 680). The traumatic experiences of the war sensitized the population to 
religious issues. The local government under Mashadov not only failed to bring armed groups 
that would not disappear with the end of the first Chechen War under control, but also 
familiarized the Chechen population with radical Islamist slogans. This eased radicalization 
processes that were fueled by ideological ideas based on Wahhabism (see Hughes 2011: 
96ff.). The so-called jamaats, social and religious meeting points for Muslim communities, 
and in this context especially the youth-focused ones, experienced a greater influence of 
jihadist and extremist groups. In the 1990s, young imams who obtained theological or 
political education abroad and returned to the North Caucasus took over the lead in various 
jamaats (see Yarlykapov 2010: 142ff.). As a consequence, an increase of radical Islamist 
structures could be observed in the North Caucasus. These emerging radical Islamist 
movements had advantages that were attractive incentives especially for young Muslims.  
 
Highly egalitarian, disciplined and ideologically anchored Jihadist groups, operating 
as military brotherhoods, provided their members with a strong sense of identity and 
solidarity, with a stable income and ensured mutual protection in the case of attacks by 
outsiders” (Souleimanov 2015: 101).  
 
Yarlykapov (2010) explains that young people in the North Caucasus are an important target 
group for extremist groups since they suffer especially from “corruption, the clan system, and 
economic problems and disorders” (Yarlykapov 2010: 149). Furthermore, their personal life 
in Russia might be affected by islamophobia, racism and nationalism.    
 Besides these internal conditions that facilitated successful radical Islamist networks in 
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the North Caucasus, other developments had an impact on the radicalization process as well. 
The participation of foreign Islamist fighters in the first Chechen War, the first transnational 
jihad in Afghanistan (1980-88) and new communication technologies further enabled the 
spread of radical Islamist ideas and made the globalization of jihadist networks possible.  
In 1999, Mashadov’s government became dependent on the personal and military 
strength of Islamists groups due to its weakness. Mashadov had to make political concessions, 
such as the appointment of Shamil Basayev, the leader of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 
as the commander in chief of the military and the implementation of Sharia laws. 
Nevertheless, aiming at the establishment of a caliphate and the expansion of jihad in the 
entire North Caucasus, Wahhabi groups under Basayev invaded Dagestan. This was followed 
by the second invasion of Russian troops in Chechnya (see Hughes 2011: 100f.). While 
Mashadov launched guerrilla activities against the Russian military, Basayev started a 
terrorist wave that was primarily directed against Russian civilians (see ibid.: 105). These 
terrorist attacks, which were particularly symbolic and claimed many victims, included 
several attacks on the Moscow Subway, the hostage-taking of over 1,000 people in the 
Moscow Dubrovka Theatre with 130 casualties as well as the hostage-taking of over 1128 
people in a school in Beslan in 2004. During the liberation of the school, up to 331 people 
were killed, including 186 children (see Pokalova 2015: 191ff.). Ever since Beslan, Basayev 
was considered as one of the most wanted terrorists in Russia and was finally executed in July 
2006 by Russian security forces. His execution and the decision of his successor, Doku 
Umarov, not to attack civilian targets, led to a sharp decline of terrorist activities (see 
Schaefer 2011: 233f.). 
However, in 2007, Umarov, who was involved as a commander in both Chechen 
Wars, proclaimed the Caucasus Emirate and thereby ended the era of the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria. He intended to connect the local insurgent groups in a large umbrella organization, 
thus to be able to coordinate their activities better (see Steinberg 2014: 2f.). The ideological 
background of the Caucasus Emirate was based on Wahhabism and was characterized by a 
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high degree of intolerance towards other religions. It condemned secularism and urged a strict 
Islamic lifestyle of the local population (see Agaev 2013: 3f.). Although the Caucasus Emirate 
followed the ideological concept of an international jihad, the main focus was on attacking 
targets in Russia. The proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate enabled the unification of all 
regions to an overall North Caucasian movement (see Schaefer 2011: 240ff.).  
 Yet, the radical Islamist groups in the respective districts could act relatively 
autonomously and, by 2012, started to ignore the former guideline not to attack civilians 
which led to over 30 acts of terrorism including the two attacks on the Domodedovo airport 
and subway in Moscow (see Ratelle 2013: 6). End of 2013, two suicide bombings with more 
than 30 casualties raised doubts about the security situation at the Sochi Winter Olympics. In 
addition, Umarov announced further attacks and thereby found a sensitive point in the 
Russian leadership which had to demonstrate strength and the ability to provide security due 
to international attention. As a consequence, massive anti-terrorist missions and repressive 
measures followed in the North Caucasus that harmed not only radical groups but also the 
general population in that region (see Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung 2014). At the 
same time, Russia opened its borders prior to the Winter Olympics, enabling the departure of 
radicalized individuals. This created a short-term win-win situation: for jihadists who no 
longer saw any prospects for local activities in this repressive environment, the alternative of 
a jihad abroad seemed much more attractive. For Russia, however, this meant a smaller 
number of radical Islamists inside the country (see International Crisis Group 2016: ii).  
As of 2014, there was a noticeable decline of terrorist activities in Russia, which can 
be attributed to effective counter-terrorism measures combined with the relocation of radical 
structures abroad. In 2014, the number of victims of radical Islamist violence fell by 41 
percent and in 2015 even by 51 percent (see ibid.: 1). In addition to the outflow of radicalized 
individuals to Syria and Iraq, the Caucasus Emirate has been weakened by further drastic 
events within the organization. In particular, the death of Doku Umarov and the lack of 
charismatic successors led to discrepancies between the different jihadist groups (see 
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Falkowski 2014: 22). Therefore, the signs of a rapprochement with ISIS in the North 
Caucasus were already prevalent at the end of 2014, when for the first time Daghestanian 
groups pledged allegiance to ISIS. A statement by the Kavkaz Center, the main website of the 
Caucasus Emirate, in March 2014, explains the relationship with ISIS. While the idea to 
establish an Islamic state is widely approved, the methods used by ISIS are heavily criticized.  
 
(…) we DO NOT hate the ISIL. We believe that the very idea of the Islamic State is 
right! However, in our opinion, the methods of its implementation, the ideology of 
takfirism, leaving the battle against infidels and starting the battle against Muslims, 
violence and mass executions, undermine on the vine this idea and provoke hostility 
and hatred from the population of Levant, which not only promotes the idea of the 
ISIL, but on the contrary – leads to a collapse. (Kavkaz Center 2014).  
 
With the assassination of Umarov's successor, Aliaskhab Kebekow, by Russian security 
forces in April 2015, the way was finally paved for an affiliation to ISIS. Chechen groups and 
other districts followed the example to pledge their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Finally, on June 25, 2015, some commanders proclaimed the entire affiliation of the Caucasus 
Emirate to ISIS. The establishment of Wilayat al-Qawkaz under the leadership of the 
Dagestani Amir Aselderov is a consequence of this. Only a few groups have distanced 
themselves from this decision and have hold faith with the leftovers of the Caucasus Emirate 
(see International Crisis Group 2016: 2). 
A special link between ISIS and jihadists in the North Caucasus lies in the common 
interest of fighting the Russian government and society. The fact that Russia supports the 
Assad regime and is involved in military actions against ISIS makes their hostility obvious. 
Furthermore, the oppression of Muslims as well as Islamic (or Islamist) structures in Russia 
itself is used by ISIS as a welcome legitimization. Since September 2014, Russia has been 
threatened consistently in messages of ISIS (see Hedenskog, Holmquist 2015: 2). In 2016, 
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there were a few attacks with radical Islamist background in Russia attacking mainly security 
forces (see Zeit Online 2016, see Kireev 2017). In published video messages, the assassins 
pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (see Dearden 2016). In 2017, especially the 
bombing attacks at the St. Petersburg subway and at a supermarket, caused many casualties 
and could therefore catch international attention (see Lister et al. 2017; The Independent 
2017). 
Mainly, the Wilayat al-Qawkaz has focused on its self-expression in several self-made 
videos. Regarding the high number of jihadists who have left the country, it can be assumed 
that the shortage of members posed a problem for the organization. Therefore, the current 
focus has been rather on recruiting new adherents and mobilizing lone perpetrators across 
Russia. However, it is likely that there will be a strengthening of radical Islamist activities, at 
the latest when the jihadists from Syria and Iraq return and make use of their ideological and 
military knowledge in the North Caucasus (see Hedenskog and Holmquist 2015: 2). While no 
exact statistics can be found on the adherents of ISIS, it can be assumed that the recruitment 
of foreign fighters is very successful, with up to 30,000 fighters of 100 different nationalities 
in 2015 (see The Soufan Group 2015: 5). Most fighters come from neighboring countries in 
the Middle East or North Africa, but also from the former Soviet Union. Depending on the 
source, the data on specific numbers vary, which are generally difficult to assess. The Soufan 
Group (2015), for example, assumes 4700 fighters from the former Soviet Union, identifying 
2400 only from Russia. Official statistics from Russia even mention 5,000 to 7,000 Russian 
fighters in Syria and Iraq. This number largely consists of persons from the North Caucasus, 
especially from Chechnya and Dagestan (see ibid.: 14f.).  
It can be observed that North Caucasian fighters occupy important positions at ISIS’s 
organization in Syria. It is generally thought that ISIS assumes that the experience gained 
during the Chechen Wars and the successful conduction of guerrilla actions have made 
fighters from the North Caucasus particularly suitable for the preparation and implementation 
of military activities. Therefore, a larger number of Chechens can be identified within the 
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security services of ISIS (see International Crisis Group 2016: 13f.). In addition to militant 
actions, North Caucasians actively participate in the production of Russian-speaking ISIS 
propaganda and also play a role in the recruitment of new supporters (see International Crisis 
Group 2016: 14). To spread propaganda, different methods have been used, ranging from 
short tweets on Twitter to professional video productions. Especially for the production of 
propaganda in Russian-speaking regions, ISIS founded the media group "Furat Media", which 
either produces its own videos with Russian-speaking ISIS fighters or translates existing 
Arabic videos into Russian. Even print media such as the glossy magazine "Istok" belong to 
the propagandistic repertoire in which Russian-speaking fighters can spread ISIS's ideology. 
In social media channels, ISIS is mainly active on Twitter, Vkontakte and the messenger 
Telegram (see International Crisis Group 2016: 29, see Europol 2015). With the supply of 
new media, the range of options for radical Islamist organizations has increased significantly. 
The Internet enables fast, global and free information transfer that can reach an infinite 
number of recipients. Generally, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
(2012) names six functions the Internet can have in this context. In addition to propaganda, 
which also includes recruitment and mobilization measures, it is also used for fundraising, 
training, planning (internal communication), carrying out terrorist actions and most recently 
cyberattacks. Radical Islamist contributions often have overlapping functions (see UNODC 
2012: 3).  
Comparing the video productions of the Caucasus Emirate and ISIS, a clear 
development of the degree of professionalism can be observed. While the videos of the 
Caucasus Emirate are often characterized by low resolution and poor sound quality, the 
videos of Wilayat al-Qawkaz are far more professional and have the technical quality of 
modern film productions. In addition, the main motivation of the Caucasus Emirate to upload 
information on the Kavkaz Center website was “communicating insurgents’ strategic 
objectives and ideology, advertising their grievances, and providing a source of daily news” 
(Ratelle; Sokirianskaia 2018: 125). Regarding the propaganda videos of the Wilayat al-
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Qawkaz, Europol identifies the two key features of providing news about the various ISIS 
districts and recruiting new adherents (see Europol 2015: 10). The International Crisis Group 
published a revealing study on the connection of North Caucasian jihadists to ISIS and the 
attractiveness of the organization in this region. The outflow of North Caucasian fighters to 
the Middle East has several causes, including religious reasons, the desire for a caliphate, the 
search for identity, and welfare benefits. Push factors such as lack of prospects and repression 
in one's own country complete the range of causes (see International Crisis Group 2016: 
24ff.). In particular, propaganda addresses these issues, concerns and longings in a 
concentrated manner and can thus contribute to strengthening the pull and push factors.  
Ratelle and Sokirianskaia (2018) analyzed the impact of jihadist online propaganda on 
violent radicalization and extremist recruitment in Russia, mainly the North Caucasus. For 
this purpose, they conducted hundreds of interviews with former extremists, Muslim and 
governmental authorities, experts and the local population (see Ratelle; Sokirianskaia 2018: 
118f.). ISIS’s propaganda is successful in the North Caucasus since it addresses different 
target groups regardless of age, gender or ethnicity. On the basis of the interviews, especially 
young respondents recognized the appealing character of ISIS’s videos. Furat Media, for 
example, has been able to create videos that attract the attention of young people by using 
well visualized emotional images of the jihad and Russian militants holding speeches. Like 
the videos, also ISIS’s print media focuses on religion, jihad and the way of life in the 
caliphate. By portraying individuals who joined the jihad in Syria and Iraq, ISIS’s propaganda 
tries to convince potential supporters to follow this path. While, on the other hand, it also 
shows the option to stay in Russia and commit domestic terrorist attacks (see ibid.: 131f.).  
Ratelle and Sokirianskaia (2018) point out that compared to the total population in Russia, 
ISIS’s propaganda resonates especially within the Chechen community due to the 
traumatizing experiences made during the wars. ISIS uses the vulnerability of their target 
groups and knows which narrative could be specifically attractive. This strategy works, for 
example, also for the female audiences. To attract women, ISIS promises them to find love, 
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romance, but also sisterhood and emancipation. ISIS provides the chance to revolt against 
traditional views of the parents’ generation or societal norms on the one hand and offers 
adventures and independence on the other. This narrative is naturally tempting for youths in 
general. Additionally, the use of pop-cultural elements, the portrayal of jihadist as popstars 
and heroes, and the use of popular social media platforms like Instagram, appeals to all young 
people (see ibid.: 140f.). 
 
Theory and Methodology 
 
In the field of radical Islamist propaganda, former research benefited from the 
theoretical considerations of the (visual) frame analysis that also provides the 
conceptualization for this research paper. First of all, the most recent publication by Theine 
(2016) analyzed content and images of German-speaking ISIS propaganda based on the 
framing approach of Benford and Snow in order to outline mainly recruitment strategies. 
Benford and Snow (2000) assume that social movements not only convey mobilizing ideas 
and values, but also produce and frame content according to their own interpretation of 
reality. The term "frame" is based on Goffman's definition of interpretive schemes that help to 
locate, perceive and identify an apparently unlimited number of concrete occurrences 
(Goffman 1977: 31). Framing therefore means to interpret events and situations and attach 
importance to them in order to mobilize as many supporters as possible (see Benford, Snow 
1988: 198). The success of mobilization depends on the compatibility of individual attitudes 
with those of the social movement, also referred to as "frame alignment" (Snow; Rochford; 
Worden; Benford 1986: 464). This means „that some set of individual interests, values and 
beliefs and SMO2 activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (ibid.). 
Benford and Snow (2000) describe how the perceived reality can be communicated 
through “collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000: 615) that are produced by social 
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movements. The collective action frames consist of three main frame dimensions, which build 
on each other and sometimes overlap in practice. They are referred to as "diagnostic framing", 
"prognostic framing" and "motivational framing" (ibid.). Their combined advantage is the 
creation of a narrative that combines the identification of problems and enemies, the proposal 
of solutions and the reasons and incentives to engage in the movement (see Benford and Snow 
2000: 613ff.). The narrative starts first with the diagnostic framing, which identifies problems 
and, in this regard, also the alleged culprit for the conflict. In addition to the identification of 
problems, social movements provide within the prognostic framing strategies and solutions 
that operate on the same level at which the problems are identified (see Benford, Snow 1988: 
201). However, the combination of diagnostic and prognostic frames is not sufficient to 
mobilize new participants. Motivational frames have to be produced additionally, which state 
reasons why the support of the goals of the respective social movement is urgent and 
inevitable. In particular, when participation involves (high) costs for the individual, the 
incentives must be presented in a very convincing manner. These can appear in material or 
ideal appearance, which might fall in the categories of wealth, status or moral belief (see ibid.: 
202). It can be assumed that the supply of material goods can certainly be an incentive given 
the high risk of terrorist actions. However, as new social movements tend to have a value-
based focus, appealing to moral obligations of the potential target group might also be 
effective. In the context of an extremist religious group, therefore, the aspect of morality 
should also play a major role.  
Theine (2016) focused his research on the three main frame dimensions, but specifies 
the frame categories after he identified the main issues used by ISIS. He defined five frames, 
namely "victim frame", “animosity frame” (diagnostic frame), "jihad frame" (prognostic 
frame) as well as "support frame" and "success frame" (motivational frame) (see Theine 2016: 
47). The "victim frame" encompasses all content based on the world-wide discrimination 
against the Muslim way of life, while the "animosity frame" identifies the perpetrators 
responsible for islamophobia and discrimination. This includes not only western-liberal 
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forces, but also all Muslims who contradict the ideology of ISIS (see ibid.: 92). As a solution, 
ISIS offers the combat, more specifically the jihad. Therefore, Theine summarizes all aspects 
of jihad and the establishment of a caliphate in the "jihad frame" (see ibid.: 93). Finally, the 
combination of the “support frame” and the “success frame” represent the motivational frame. 
The "support frame" consists of all issues that highlight the "religious and moral duty" (ibid.: 
93) of Muslims. The incentive is the establishment of a caliphate by living according to the 
rules of sharia law which alone is a guarantee for the entry into paradise in the afterlife (see 
ibid.: 93). Finally, within the framework of the "success frame", every successful outcome of 
ISIS’s activities is justified with the approval of Allah, that they gained due to the strict 
interpretation of the Qur'an (see ibid.: 94).  
Aiming to mobilize as many individuals as possible, framing can only be an effective 
tool when the created narrative has credibility that is not easily questioned by the recipients. 
Divided into consistency, empirical credibility and credibility of the speaker, these have a 
high significance for the success and the mobilization strength of frame content (see Benford, 
Snow 2000: 619). Consistency exists when the content and action of a social movement 
match. The more contradictory these are, the less resonant the frames will appear. Since the 
incurred confusion is an inconsistency for potential supporters, it provides less mobilization 
potential (see ibid.: 620). The empirical credibility, however, refers to the relationship 
between framing and "events in the world" (Benford, Snow 1988: 208). The recipient puts the 
narrative of the framing in relation to real events and facts and decides about the credibility 
based on this comparison. Ultimately, this means that recipients test the interpretation 
frameworks of social movements for their empirical evidence. However, this is a subjective 
test in which the definitive power over reality and evidence lies with the individual (see ibid.: 
208). Finally, besides the content-related aspects, the credibility of speakers plays a 
significant role. Also in this case, credibility depends on the individual assessment of the 
recipient. However, some indicators can be identified in general that indicate a credible and 
thus convincing speaker. Wiktorowicz (2005) names reputation here, authenticity, spiritual 
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authority, knowledge, character and personality (Wiktorowicz 2005, in: Pisoiu 2013: 57). 
Depending on the focus and target group of the social movement, it can be assumed that the 
speaker's qualities are assessed differently in terms of perceived credibility (see Benford 
1987: 166). 
Mainly, the classic framing approach has included only the textual level in former 
research. With the increasing importance of media content, however, visual framing has 
established a new research direction that explicitly deals with the effects and functions of 
images (see Geise, Lobinger 2013: 9). Visual framing has the advantage of including all 
aspects of footage in the analysis, and thus has broader patterns of explanation compared to a 
purely textual focus (see Coleman 2010: 233). In addition, visual framing can highlight the 
symbolic and emotional nature of propaganda. Text-based content often fails to achieve the 
same expressiveness as images (see Coleman 2010: 235). Images are better remembered and 
have a greater impact on the perception of individuals. In addition, emotionally strong 
pictures, in particular of a negative nature, can generate a high level of attention of the 
recipient (see ibid.: 243). Another and perhaps the most significant advantage of image-based 
propaganda, is that images are doubted less than texts. Since recipients see the particular 
situation with their own eyes, they can relate directly to reality and consider what they have 
seen to be more credible than purely verbal or written statements (see Messaris; Abraham 
2001: 216). Additionally, images require less cognitive effort, are more superficially 
processed by the recipient, and therefore less likely to be questioned (see Rodriguez; 
Dimitrova 2011: 50). Visual elements are hence predestined to create suitable interpretive 
frameworks based on the respective ideological background (see Messaris, Abraham 2001: 
220). Especially in the context of recruitment strategies of radical Islamist movements, 
images can disseminate ideological concepts in a simple and vivid way. In general, it can be 
assumed that a tactical use and concatenation of images put the recipient in a certain mood, 
which can have a polarizing and mobilizing effect. 
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Bernhardt (2016) focused more on visual framing and examines ISIS's propaganda 
strategies based on a video analysis showing the way of life in the ISIS capital Raqqa. On the 
basis of four Arabic-language videos, she identified four frames (everyday life frame, 
community frame, religiosity frame and visual frame: mental and symbolic presence of ISIS), 
thereby analyzing the thematic setting and the visual realization by ISIS (see Bernhardt 2016: 
159f.). In the community frame, for example, all motifs are summarized, that address the 
harmonic and peaceful coexistence in Raqqa (see ibid.: 159). The frame of religiosity, on the 
other hand, considers all motifs that emphasize the importance of religion, for example with 
scenes in mosques (see ibid.: 159). All frames taken together, ISIS intends to demonstrate that 
it can guarantee order, necessary supplies and solidarity on the basis of God-given rules (see 
ibid.: 162). The relevance of the results lies in the ability to show that ISIS is also able to 
produce content beyond violence and destruction. The emphasis on "civilian" frames is an 
important supplement to the analysis of ISIS’s propaganda strategies and can give clues about 
the potential target group of recruitment (see ibid.: 161f.). 
Furthermore, Winter (2015), for example, identified six themes that ISIS uses for 
different target groups and purposes. The main target groups are particularly potential and 
actual supporters, the local population in Syria and Iraq, international media and worldwide 
opponents. The narrative can focus on one target group, but most likely covers different 
intentions for various groups (see Winter 2015: 6f.). While “brutality” is the most well-known 
narrative, introducing “utopianism” seems to have high priority in ISIS’s propaganda. 
Brutality as a narrative can proof strength and power to supporters, but mainly intends to 
spread fear within the public in the occupied region as well as in hostile countries. Other 
violent images deal with armed struggle and war in Syria and Iraq. Military actions, trainings 
and successful operations are shown in the “war” narrative to illustrate supremacy but also to 
convince the public of being a real state with a real army. ISIS offers the option to change 
sides by regretting one’s past hostile attitudes towards the organization and being completely 
conform to the caliphate within the “mercy” narrative. The affiliation to ISIS is linked to 
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benefits supporters can expect. The “belonging” narrative seems to be particularly interesting 
for the target group of foreign supporters since it highlights the idea of brotherhood (or 
sisterhood), community and solidarity. Furthermore, it gives the target group a purpose and 
provides identity. Finally, the “utopianism” narrative shows the caliphate as the realization of 
an Islamic state that provides secure and stable living conditions with the strict interpretation 
of the Qu’ran as a guideline for society and politics. ISIS legitimizes its actions and brutality 
with the portrayal of an apocalyptical situation in which the so-called enemies of Islam have 
started a war against all Muslims. This war is understood as a fight between good and evil, 
between faithful Muslims and sinful unbelievers (see ibid.: 22ff.).  
The findings of the theoretical background as well as the state of research serve as a 
basis for the construction of a methodological framework. The methodological approach is 
based on qualitative social research with the aim of presenting the analyzed material as 
structured as possible, while using interpretative measures. An in-depth case study on the 
North Caucasus will reveal narratives, strategies and goals of the radical Islamist propaganda 
videos of ISIS in this region. This is done by using a frame analysis that points out core 
themes, interpretive frameworks and strategic implementations. Accordingly, the research 
question aims to analyze how content within radical Islamist propaganda videos is framed and 
strategically used. The division of content into frame categories and the interpretation of their 
content reduce the variety of meaning (Flick 1991: 165) and thereby facilitate a (further) 
analysis of the material. The interpretativity (Lamnek 2010: 461) or, in other words, the 
interpretation of the communicated content, constitutes the basis of a qualitative content 
analysis. The content was divided into typologies, aiming for the creation of a category 
system (see Lamnek 2010: 462ff.). Such a methodological approach is particularly attractive 
for the analysis of research objects that have been considered under-researched. Therefore, 
qualitative content analysis is regarded as a suitable tool to examine case studies (see Mayring 
2010: 23). The choice of categories was strongly influenced by findings from the current state 
of research and includes, in particular, the publications of Theine (2016), Bernhardt (2016) 
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and Winter (2015). In addition, region-specific research has influenced the selection, allowing 
categories to be modeled case-specifically after reviewing the study material. For 
intersubjective verifiability, the categories and codes have been transparently disclosed. The 
set of the categories is based on the premise of providing a complete picture of all relevant 
aspects. The categories should be clearly distinguishable and reflect one specific focus (see 
Roessler 2010: 101f.). 
 
Figure 1: Categorization of the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames 
Diagnostic Frame Prognostic Frame 
Oppression Frame Jihad Frame 
Violence and 
Discrimination 
against Muslims 
Enemy Images 
Fight against 
Enemies 
Establishment of a 
Caliphate & 
Introduction of the 
Sharia 
 
 
Motivational Frames 
Duty Frame Reward Frame 
Religious & Moral Duty Secular & Religious Reward 
Relevance of Apostasy Orientation, Ideology, Meaning of Life 
 
The diagnostic frame is represented by the oppression frame, in which two directions 
are particularly crucial. First, violence and discrimination against Muslims have been 
identified as the main problem that was expressed at a historical, political or social level. One 
advantage of the oppression frame for radical Islamist organizations is that it enables them to 
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present themselves as victims of external circumstances and legitimize their actions as a 
necessary evil. Furthermore, the origin of the problem must be connected to the definition of 
(alleged or real) perpetrators, namely the enemies and out-group. This may include abstract 
(states), collective (non-religious, "unbelievers") or individual (political, military or religious 
leaders) enemies. The jihad frame as the main prognostic frame articulates actions leading to a 
solution. Radical Islamist organizations offer jihad that can manifest itself in various forms, 
but is always understood as a militant combat against the "enemy." In this context, besides the 
destruction of the enemy and the corresponding way of lifestyle, the creation of a caliphate 
and the introduction of sharia was regarded as the main solution offered by ISIS. The 
motivational frame was split into the duty and reward frame. The intention has been to 
identify the main push and pull factors that can strategically promote mobilization and 
recruitment. The duty frame focuses in particular on the religious and moral duty. However, 
the range and characteristics of these can be different, but are specifically extreme in radical 
Islamist contexts. In order to mobilize for jihad, it must therefore be convincingly 
demonstrated that this is a duty for every Muslim. Thus, according to the logic of radical 
Islamist organizations, all Muslims who do not join jihad are on the same level as 
"unbelievers”. Muslims who contradict ISIS' ideology are accused of apostasy. Particularly 
crucial here is the concept of takfir, which is practiced only by certain radical Islamist 
organizations and legitimizes the fight against other Muslims. The reward frame includes all 
factors that might be considered as advantages for individuals. For example, a secular reward 
can be the promise of wealth. A spiritual reward, on the other hand, can be paradise after a 
martyr's death. In addition, it was examined to what extent orientation and identity is offered 
as a positive incentive, which includes for example particular statements of recruited 
individuals who express a new meaning in life. 
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Figure 2: Categorization of visual frames 
Visual Frames 
Violence Frame Community Frame 
Characterization of Victims and Perpetrators 
Solidarity of the in-group, Identity, 
Philanthropy 
 
The visual frames focus on two relevant areas that can have an impact on the 
transmission of content or emotions through visual representations. First of all, the 
characteristics and usage of depictions of violence were investigated while the construction of 
images of victims and perpetrators was considered as well. The community frame summarizes 
visual illustrations that meant to reinforce the meaning of the group. The visualization of 
friendship and aspects that demonstrate solidarity, such as family and fondness for children 
were reflected in the community frame. 
The frame analysis is based on a total of five Russian-language videos, which do not 
exceed a length of 30 minutes. All videos were shot or released between the years 2015 and 
2016. The sample of available and relevant videos can be found on the Jihadology3 website. 
The exact amount of radical Islamist propaganda videos in the North Caucasus remains in the 
dark, due to the limited access for researchers in such spheres and the frequent deleting of 
these videos from public platforms used by ISIS. The validity of this research might be 
affected by the total sample’s small number and lead to the lack of representativeness of the 
results. This demands further research filling the gap by taking additional videos into account. 
Nevertheless, the analyzed videos provide a large amount of content due to their length. Their 
selection was based on the concept of "purposeful sampling" (Patton 1990: 169) which 
encompasses several strategies that can lead to insightful results. In this context, intensity 
sampling (Patton 1990: 171) and maximum variation sampling (Patton 1990: 172) are used in 
particular. Intensity sampling takes into account those cases that contain meaningful 
                                                 
3 http://jihadology.net 
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information and that reflect intensely the phenomenon of interest. On the other hand, the 
maximum variation sampling pays attention to ensure that the selected cases pick up on a 
variety of aspects and thus enable a wide range of different findings (see Patton 1990: 169ff.). 
 
Figure 3: Sampling of the propaganda videos  
 Wilayat al-Qawkaz Date Length (min) 
1 Message from the Mujahidin September 2015 20:18 
2 The Lone Wolf November 2015 21:54 
3 A Profit that will never perish March 2016 12:31 
4 The Disease and the Medicine March 2016 26:32 
5 Now, now the Fighting comes December 2016 13:40 
 
 
Frames and Strategies of ISIS's Propaganda Videos in the North Caucasus 
 
Based on the methodological concept, the most relevant information for the analysis is chosen 
from the available primary sources. Every frame is examined on a systematic basis and put in 
relation to each other. The interpretation of the frames gives an insight into ISIS's worldview 
and intentions. More important, it reveals its strategies to influence and manipulate the target 
group. This leads to another advantage of the frame analysis. Knowing ISIS's topics, 
approaches and incentives, it is possible to assume the characteristics of the individuals 
assembling the target group and further which distinctive features of ISIS might be attractive 
for them. 
 
Collective Action Frames 
Beginning the analysis with the collective action frames by Benford and Snow, the 
propaganda is divided into the categories of oppression frame, jihad frame, duty frame and 
reward frame. The aim is to point out how ISIS frames problems, solutions and incentives in 
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the particular case of the North Caucasus. The accentuation of oppression and the 
identification of associated enemy images run like a thread through the examined radical 
Islamist propaganda videos. The focus of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz is the oppression of Muslims 
in the North Caucasus, which emanates mainly from Russia. Russia is considered to be the 
main enemy that is, within the oppression frame, consistently accused of immense crime and 
violence against Muslims. It can be observed that at many points in the videos, the narrative 
provides a simple worldview that is split in “good” and “evil” and focuses on the 
demonization of Russia and overall victimization of Muslims. 
While there are videos of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz that are produced with less effort (no 
cuts, one image), some of the productions are strongly oriented towards the character of 
documentary movies. These were filmed with modern media technology and/or are a 
compilation of high quality film footage. The advantage of videos designed in a documentary 
way is the convincing visualization of historical and political events. This is particularly 
significant in the oppression frame, as it shows in a vivid and mostly emotional way how the 
enemy has threatened the Muslim community from the past until the present. Since recipients 
might perceive these videos as educational movies without questioning the messages, this 
makes it easy for the Wilayat al-Qawkaz to exploit some events in the past (that are not made 
up entirely) for its own ends. In particular, there are two videos in which, from the Tsarist 
Empire, the Soviet Union up until contemporary Russia under Putin, all stages of oppression 
are described in detail. The Wilayat al-Qawkaz accuses Russia of horrendous crimes, 
mentioning in particular high numbers of expulsions, persecutions and mass murders of 
Muslims (The Disease and the Medicine, The Lone Wolf). The severity of oppression is 
illustrated by dramatic and metaphorical language such as: 
 
The history of the Caucasus consists of pages in which the heart is bleeding, they cry 
with pain and choke with tears (The Disease and the Medicine)  
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or 
 
Russia, a land of history that has been soaked with the blood and suffering of innocent 
people since its foundation and until today (The Lone Wolf). 
 
In addition to the "atrocities" in the North Caucasus, in which a strong reference to the two 
Chechen Wars is made, the Wilayat al-Qawkaz refers to the Russian activities in the Middle 
East. At first, the Afghanistan War is mentioned, that is perceived as "10 years of murder, 
cruelty, violence, bombing and tyranny" (The Lone Wolf). It continues with the current 
development and involvement of Russian troops in Syria. Russia is accused of being 
responsible for hundreds of thousands of victims as a result of supporting Assad and their own 
bombing (The Lone Wolf). In this context, however, the blame is not only put on the Russian 
leadership, but also on the Russian society that agrees with the political agenda of its 
government and therefore share the responsibility for the alleged crimes.  
 
It is unimaginable that this is carried out only by a handful of politicians without the 
support of the army and the people. (...) Their people are direct participants in this 
bloodshed because their leadership could never have done their crimes without the 
consent of the people (The Lone Wolf). 
 
Furthermore, the Wilayat al-Qawkaz adds an enemy image that is particularly distinctive for 
ISIS's ideology. It is about North Caucasians and Muslims who cooperate with Russian 
authorities and are therefore regarded as supporters of the system that is oppressing the 
Muslim community. This kind of person is called “Murtadd”, which would translate to being 
an “apostate” and means, within an Islamic interpretation, people who abandoned the 
religious path of Islam (see Heffening 2012). Since they are accused of betraying Islam, 
Murtadds are on the same hierarchical position as Russians and infidels.  
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They (apostates) were the reason for the division of Muslims and the loss of identity. 
Infidels, the enemies of Muslims, benefit from the spread of these sects and 
communities and have used them against Islam and Muslims (The Disease and the 
Medicine). 
 
The characteristics and actions which define an apostate are kept relatively vague. However, 
by reference to the next statement, it can be assumed that it refers to any person who does not 
support the jihadists.  
 
They became Russian puppets - apostates who look like Muslims helping the Islam 
and call to it. So, they conquered the whole religion for their masters, the invaders. 
They are a disease and misfortune for you. Beware of them, oh inhabitants of the 
Caucasus. The point has come that the apostate leadership has begun sending their 
recruits to help killing mujaheddin (The Disease and the Medicine). 
 
Finally, the "apostates" consist also of Sufi adherents, whose communities are considered by 
ISIS as sects that harm Islam by estrangement from monotheism (The Disease and the 
Medicine). After naming the perceived threats and the enemies causing these, Wilayat al-
Qawkaz offers within the prognostic frame the solution, precisely the path to the solution, 
which is in this case joining the jihad. The jihad plays a central role and continues as a 
thematic focus continuously through the entire propaganda. This makes sense, since this 
frame is linked by announcing the aims strongly with the recruitment of new followers. 
Within the propaganda videos, the jihad is vividly illustrated and described. Explicit video 
excerpts of attacks, the presentation of weapons, and detailed descriptions of how individuals 
can commit effective attacks suggest that the mobilization of single perpetrators (lone wolves) 
and the recruitment of new jihadists can be identified as one of the key objectives of Wilayat 
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al-Qawkaz's propaganda videos. Being aware that joining the Wilayat or committing complex 
attacks may have many obstacles, it calls increasingly for “small” and local attacks.  
 
If they cannot join the jihad, then (...) the caliph said that a rope or a knife is perfectly 
adequate. And that's why brothers, you do not have to go somewhere, for example, do 
anything, if you cannot join us, because (...) Russia is huge and there are enough 
infidels (A Profit that will never perish). 
 
Partially, various options are presented to participate in jihad, which is largely associated with 
the murder of "infidels ". In some sequences, Arabic-language sound recordings are integrated 
in the local propaganda and translated through subtitles into Russian. These messages reveal a 
special mercilessness against the “enemies”.  
 
And if you cannot find a bomb or weapon, then ambush the American or French 
infidels or any of their allies. Hit his head with a stone or stab him. Crush him with his 
car or throw him down from heights. Choke or poison him. Show no weakness or 
mercy (Now, now the Fighting comes). 
 
The target group is addressed directly and motivated to act quickly. Self-sufficiency and self-
sacrifice are demanded from the potential assassins (The Lone Wolf). The appreciation of a 
human life is expectably low while the martyr's death is preferred over living in the secular 
world. Dying for Allah is considered as an honorable goal (Message from the Mujahidin). On 
the one hand, this can have a high impact on the potential target group, since it paradoxically 
creates a meaning of life or a purpose of the own existence. On the other hand, the 
fearlessness of death creates a threat scenario that makes Wilayat al-Qawkaz as a terrorist 
organization and its counteraction unpredictable (Message from the Mujahidin). 
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Referring to the enemy images of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, violent attacks in the name of 
jihad are addressed not only against infidels but also against so-called apostates. These are, as 
mentioned in the oppression frame, mostly Muslims working with (and therefore allegedly 
supporting) Russian institutions (Message from the Mujahidin). They make no distinction 
between locals and Russians, which increases the sphere of attack targets and scopes of jihad. 
In addition to the mobilization of single perpetrators, attacks of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz itself 
are proclaimed. In this context, the availability of adherents and the arsenal of weaponry are 
emphasized while the latter of which is also shown confidently in some scenes (Message from 
the Mujahidin; Now, now the Fighting comes). Quite surprisingly, the aims of jihad are kept 
vague. However, a few scenes indicate that it is sought to achieve Sharia law and an Islamic 
state, based on the model of Syria and Iraq (A Profit that will never perish). 
Since the participation in radical Islamist activities is likely to entail high costs, the 
motivational frame is examined from two perspectives. While analyzing the videos in regard 
of possible incentives, the duty frame takes a much larger role than the reward frame. The 
duty frame is mostly based on the fear of Allah's punishment in case of not observing his 
rules. According to Wilayat al-Qawkaz, every Muslim is obliged to follow the path of jihad. 
This duty is linked to the (alleged) devastating situation of Muslims worldwide. On the one 
hand, it is said that Muslims suffer in bad conditions and would even work as slaves for 
infidels (Message from the Mujahidin). On the other hand, it is criticized that especially the 
youth is concerned only with secular and sinful activities (Message from the Mujahidin). The 
duty frame is highly connected to the oppression and jihad frame. Hence, one of the strategies 
is to compare leisure activities of the Muslim youth in the North Caucasus with those of the 
jihadists. In contrast to jihadists, this youth would not take their duty as Muslims seriously 
and do not support changing the oppressed situation of the Muslim community in the world. 
  
And what is the Muslim youth nowadays concerned with? What are they doing while 
their fathers and brothers are killed, their mothers and sisters are raped? Where are the 
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men of this umma? Do you see them on the battlefields? Do you see them protecting 
this religion? Do you see them protecting the sisters' honor? No! (The Lone Wolf). 
 
The impact of the duty frame seems even greater by using rhetorical questions, also because 
they work on an extreme emotional level. In summary, the duty frame works in particular by 
calling attention to the oppression of Muslims and, at the same time, by referring back to the 
jihad frame, showing the responsibility of young Muslims for the Islamic community. These 
duties are based on the affiliation to Islam, but also on the principles of masculinity and 
honor. 
Compared to the duty frame, there are significantly fewer positive incentives in the 
propaganda videos that go beyond the end of oppression, freedom for Muslims, and greater 
influence of Islamic laws. In the case of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, the rewards are mostly vague 
and include, in particular, the terms "success" and "victory" that are essential in the context of 
Allah's support (The Disease and the Medicine; Message from the Mujahidin). Additionally, it 
turns out that the reward frame is based not only on the secular success of ISIS, but also on 
the approach that life after death is preferable to this world. This is again argued by references 
to Allah, who will meet the jihadists in the afterlife and reward them although it remains open 
in what manner (Now, now the Fighting comes). It has been difficult though to link specific 
sequences to the offer of identity and orientation. Nevertheless, the overall picture of the 
proposed solution, joining the jihad, in order to protect the alleged unity of Muslims, might 
contribute to influence the particular part of the target group seeking for a meaning of life. 
Belonging to an in-group is not specifically enhanced, but within the visual frame analysis, 
the community frame illustrates a relevant indicator showing its relevance (see next chapter). 
In conclusion, Wilayat al-Qawkaz's propaganda videos emphasize less individual benefits. 
The reward frame therefore largely refers to collective incentives and is closely linked to the 
goals mentioned in the jihad frame.  
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Violence and Community  
The visualization of violence can be found especially in Wilayat al-Qawkaz's more 
professional video productions. While violence is shown in a high degree, there are two 
different appearances. The first one shows violence committed against Muslims, including 
children, women, families, and the elderly. In this case, close-ups are often chosen in which 
the faces of the victims are clearly visible. As a result, the horror of violence appears stronger 
and more personalized by showing individuals. In addition, war zones function as the settings 
in which showing destroyed cities and buildings dramatize the situation in a visually strong 
way (The Disease and the Medicine). The portrayal of victims from vulnerable populations, 
especially children, can trigger extreme feelings of compassion, but also anger and hatred. 
This visual strategy reinforces and visualizes the oppression frame and lead with the 
associated call to action to the jihad frame. This specific violence frame is addressed to the 
target group of potential supporters and sympathizers.  
On the other hand, the visualization of violence serves as a demonstration of power 
and strength against enemies. In this context, executed or injured enemies are shown, which 
can be military as well as civilian targets. Furthermore, it is not unusual that apostates are in 
the focus since they are likely to be easily reached due to their geographical proximity in the 
North Caucasus compared with targets in Russia (Now, now the Fighting comes). Also from 
this perspective of violence, close-ups are increasingly used. Among the casualties are only 
young men, which arguably points out that ISIS generally, in contrast to its enemies, does not 
assault women, children and the elderly. Strategically, this tries to create moral superiority 
and threats towards worldwide enemies that are the target group of this narrative. In addition 
to random photo spreads of dead enemies, violent attacks are also added as short video clips. 
These scenes are related to the jihad frame (Now, now the Fighting comes). The visualization 
of violence serves here as a guideline to the process of killing, making murder legitimate and 
common means. Finally, the high amount of extremely violent scenes might aim to normalize 
violence and let the potential adherents become accustomed with it.  
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Along with the violence frame, Wilayat al-Qawkaz highlights the importance of the in-
group within the community frame, showing two main characteristics. The first one is 
connected to the violence frame because it points out the strength, masculinity and the will to 
make use of heavy arms. The jihadists of Wilayat al-Qawkaz usually present themselves 
heavily armed and dressed in military uniform as it is shown in image 1. Six members of 
Wilayat al-Qawkaz pose in the woods in front of the ISIS flag with machine guns. In this 
sequence, the jihadists try to convince the audience to join the jihad in the North Caucasus or 
to commit attacks elsewhere in Russia. The combination of their appearance, showing them as 
actually involved in the jihad by carrying heavy arms, and their goal to make the audience 
follow their example, should be considered as an effective mobilization strategy.  
 
Image 1: Jihadists as a collective entity 
  
Source: A Profit that will never perish 02:50min 
 
The following image (2) gives an insight to a highly symbolic moment. A group of young 
jihadists pledge their allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As they present 
themselves as the in-group, they swear the oath as a collective and, more symbolic, put their 
hands together while doing so. It is striking that some jihadists are smiling during this process 
even though the confession to a terrorist organization is obviously a serious matter. It can be 
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assumed that the regional group affiliation plays an important role in the identity of these 
individuals.  
 
Image 2: Jihadists as a community 
  
Source: Now, now the Fighting comes 05:47min 
 
Image 3 reveals another characteristic of the community frame. Under the condition that the 
identification with the in-group is highly important to understand radicalization processes of 
individuals, ISIS manages to also show its “humane” face within the propaganda videos. 
Therefore, some sequences show the jihadists in their everyday life. Jihadists are sitting in a 
circle while preparing and drinking tea. Thus, ISIS affiliated groups can present themselves as 
fighting units, but also as a community where individuals can exchange their thoughts and 
beliefs.  
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Image 3: Jihadists in everyday life 
  
Source: The Disease and the Medicine 17:30min 
 
In addition, the attempt is being made to create a harmonic atmosphere in which jihadists can 
also live together with their family and children. Image 4 portrays a jihadist with two, 
potentially his own, children in an idyllic landscape. He smiles and seems to be a loving 
family man. These sequences are complementary to the violence and jihad frames in which 
mercilessness is demanded by all jihadists. In another scene, a member of Wilayat al-Qawkaz 
expresses this as follows: 
 
These unbelievers, Russians, tell you that we the mujahideen want to kill kids, blast 
schools, (...) these are lies against the mujahideen, so you will stir up hatred against us 
(...). Wallah, we do not intend to blow up. If we had wanted so, we would have blown 
up long ago. This is a crime for us. Allah forbids us to kill children, women, and the 
old. And we never commit such crimes (Message from the Mujahidin). 
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Image 4: Jihadist as the loving family man  
  
Source: The Disease and the Medicine 10:37min 
 
In conclusion, the community frame plays a strategic role, as it presents the supporters of ISIS 
as moral people and not just bloodthirsty fighters. It creates identity and is strengthened 
through a clear distinction to the out-group. Overall, visual frames let aspects of radical 
Islamist propaganda videos appear more credible since they have a strong influence on the 
strengthening of communicated content. It has been shown that while the visual frames can be 
classified into specific topics such as violence or community, they are always tied to the 
oppression, jihad or motivational frames. In particular, the visual frames have the ability to 
convey or intensify emotions that are useful tools within the three main frame dimensions. In 
the context of the oppression frame, for example, the visualization of violence is increasingly 
being used, which illustrates the brutality of the enemy that is also directed against 
defenseless groups of people. Finally, the oppression frame in connection with the violence 
frame tries to legitimize the own acts of violence against their enemies. The community 
frame, on the other hand, can support the motivational frame, especially the reward frame, by 
propagating a collective consciousness that may be attractive to potential supporters. 
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Credibility and Effectiveness 
 
Considering the aspect of consistency, it was examined whether the frames themselves as well 
as related to the activities of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, respectively ISIS, were free of self-
contradictions. At first, it must be stated that as soon as individuals accept the ideological 
framework and are vulnerable to propaganda, even irrational statements can be perceived as 
the truth (see Theine 2016: 53). In the case of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, it can be assumed that 
recipients perceive less contradiction when they are already receptive to radical Islamist 
ideology. ISIS's efforts to disseminate propaganda as historical facts in form of documentary 
films would have to work in particular if individuals have been already affected by 
discrimination and potentially have consumed sources of information that confirm their 
views. Also, in the context of the community frame and the strategy to present oneself 
positively, this can only succeed if individuals are not properly informed about ISIS’s 
activities. For example, a jihadist of Wilayat al-Qawkaz assures that killing children, women, 
and the elderly is not one of the intentions (Message from the Mujahidin). This might be 
accurate so far in the North Caucasus, but it contradicts the general approach of ISIS. 
Theoretically, inconsistencies can be identified. Nevertheless, if the ideological framework 
has been accepted, these contradictions will, in all probability, not have a major impact on the 
mobilization strength of radical Islamist organizations because facts take a rather secondary 
position. 
The analysis of empirical credibility requires to examine the frames in relation to 
realistic and reasonable facts. Since the closeness to reality of propaganda depends on the 
individual subjectivity of recipients, a sociological analysis can only attempt to compare the 
propaganda with historical and political facts. A comparison is possible with the oppression 
frame, since most efforts can be observed here referring to past and current events. To a large 
extent, Wilayat al-Qawkaz's argumentation is based on its own interpretation of the past and 
present. Due to the use of a documentary style, the video sequences can likely be perceived as 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Anna Seib: Wilayat al-Qawkaz - The Islamic State in the North Caucasus 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
credible information. It can be assumed that thereby the biased content that is relevant in the 
oppression frame is perceived by the recipients as reality. Especially two of the five examined 
videos demonstrate the relevance of the reference to "reality" for the argumentation of ISIS. 
Both videos address in great detail the (alleged) historical and current oppression (The Lone 
Wolf; The Disease and the Medicine).  
The historical part shown in the videos is divided into three phases that represent the 
period of the Tsarists Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Here, the 
argumentative strength lies in the presentation of data and numbers and becomes particularly 
apparent in the oppression frame by the reference to high numbers of Muslim victims who 
died in this context (The Lone Wolf; The Disease and the Medicine). Furthermore, there are 
also rhetorical techniques that are based on the linguistic “flourish” of content, which includes 
the choice of words that simplifies, dramatizes and visualizes the subjects. Examples would 
be expressions such as "bloodsucker", "bloodlust", "enslavement", "obliterating" or 
"annihilating" (The Lone Wolf). This rhetorical strategy with an extreme choice of words and 
an emphasis on an almost demonic enemy encourages the radicalization of vulnerable 
individuals who prefer a simple division of the world into good and evil.  
Far more difficult is the analysis of empirical verifiability in the jihad frame. Since it is 
strongly linked to the oppression frame, the jihad frame is rather limited to draw the 
argumentative strength from the prognostic frame. The relation to reality is therefore less 
given in the context of the jihad frame, also because the argument is based more on Islamist 
beliefs. The same applies to the motivational frames, since these are likewise stronger based 
on Islamist rules, laws and beliefs than on a worldly comprehensible reality. In summary, 
there indeed exist links to reality, which play particularly a major role in the oppression 
frame. However, this reality is biased and framed as conforming to ISIS's ideology. Based on 
the thesis that visualized content is less questioned, visual frames additionally support the 
empirical credibility, which increases the likelihood that propaganda is perceived as reality.  
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Furthermore, the effectiveness of propaganda videos depends on the credibility of speakers. 
On the basis of the examined propaganda videos, three speaker types can be identified, which 
are potentially able to create credibility by their hierarchical position in the organization 
and/or by adequate personality traits. First of all, there are the “leaders”, who can be divided 
into organizational and religious leaders. In the case of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, the choice of 
speakers is broad and focused not just on one or a few main characters. Considered as leaders 
are also representatives of local subgroups who play a leading role within the propaganda 
videos and who moderate further speech contributions. However, in this case it remains 
unclear what concrete background, with regard to the combat experience, the speakers feature. 
Most of these are relatively old speakers, so that recipients could perceive them as reputable 
jihadists.  
Besides militant leaders, the choice of speakers includes also leaders with alleged 
religious authenticity. Occasionally, the boundaries between organizational and religious 
leaders blur. Powerful scenes are created such as in image 5, where the black-and-white shot 
shows a charismatic jihadist reciting a Nashid, while in the background a supposedly large 
number of armed jihadists with weapons and ISIS flags silently listen to it. The speaker 
combines religious and organizational elements through his singing and acting as an armed 
and uniformed jihadist. In addition, this awakens the association of an Islamist Che Guevara 
by his appearance as well as by the "revolutionary romanticism" generated from the Nashid. 
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Image 5: Charismatic jihadist leader  
  
Source: The lone Wolf 14:55min 
 
The last speaker type consists of “ordinary” jihadists. They play a significant role regarding 
the persuasive power of radical Islamist propaganda, as they are theoretically perceived by 
potentially new recruits at the same hierarchical level. Joining the jihad is the one step that 
would need to be done to become a part of the in-group. These jihadists are mostly young 
men who demonstrate themselves as strong-willed, armed and uniformed. They call for jihad 
and emphasize here the obligatory nature for every Muslim. The strength of credibility lies in 
the authenticity of the speakers. Ordinary jihadists can serve as role models, as they have 
already joined the jihad despite the risks and consequences. In summary, all three types of 
speakers can have an influence on the credibility of the frames. Hereby, not only the 
reputation of charismatic leaders is important, but also the presence of "normal" jihadists, 
with whom young people can initially identify more. 
 
Conclusion and Outlook  
 
In conclusion, the (visual) frame analysis facilitated identifying the characteristics of radical 
Islamist propaganda videos in the North Caucasus and pointed out the interpretative 
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framework of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, ISIS’s North Caucasian branch. It has been discussed that 
the analyzed videos offer a variety of themes, perspectives and images that are framed based 
on ISIS’s ideology. ISIS is able to attract individuals regardless of gender, ethnicity or age by 
disseminating well visualized narratives that address problems the target groups are affected 
by. It could be observed that the oppression and discrimination of Muslims are communicated 
as the main issue. In this context, the out-group of unbelievers, especially Russia and its allies, 
are held responsible for causing the devastating situation of Muslims in the North Caucasus 
and around the world. Therefore, the propaganda shows a strong and noble in-group opposing 
the perceived enemy as the “evil” and morally reprehensible out-group. It is intended to 
generate and increase the identification with the in-group. Wilayat al-Qawkaz offers group 
identity, orientation and ideology and seems to be, regarding the radicalized jihadists in the 
propaganda videos, especially attractive to the youth. Considering the ongoing devastating 
social and economic situation in the North Caucasus, it might be not surprising that extreme 
ideologies can spread and reach social groups without prospects. According to the Wilayat al-
Qawkaz, only the jihad, as the combat against unbelievers and enemies of Islam, can change 
this situation and establish an Islamic state based on the strict interpretation of the Qu’ran. 
Jihad means not only to join ISIS, but includes basically every attempt to attack unbelievers in 
Russia or elsewhere. The analysis of the jihad frame reveals the extreme rhetoric that gives 
precise instructions for violent actions against mostly civilian goals. The speaking jihadists 
give advice about weapons that can be used and highlight the importance of not showing 
mercy against enemies.  
The separation of the motivational frame into the duty frame and reward frame gives 
an insight into potential push and pull factors. The duty frame plays a significant role in 
recruiting new supporters, since radical Islamist propaganda relies on Muslims "becoming 
aware" of their duty to join jihad against opponents and unbelievers. The results of the 
marginally existing reward frame are quite surprising, since it was initially assumed that the 
participation in radical Islamist terrorist organizations is associated with significant costs and 
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should therefore presuppose attractive religious or material incentives. Nevertheless, even 
though it is not communicated verbally, the benefits of belonging to a collective that has a 
common purpose, are promoted within the visual community frame which shows the civil and 
human side of ISIS. It creates group identity and supports the image of a reliable in-group. 
As opposed to this, the violence frame, that is linked to the oppression and jihad 
frame, propagates either the cruelty of the enemies or the own strength and mercilessness 
against them. The visually pleasing presentation makes the content look not only vivid, but 
also credible. The visualization of propaganda in form of videos is a phenomenon of modern 
organizations. The quality of the propaganda videos is striking and based on professional 
media technology and media competence. In the case of Wilayat al-Qawkaz, it was possible 
to monitor the media strategy to recruit new adherents by addressing regional problems. The 
propagandistic nature is hereby hidden in an appearing documentary form in order to impart 
the own interpretation of historical and political events.  
No propaganda is effective if it is not believed by potential target groups. Therefore, 
the analysis of the credibility of the frames is particular important. The empirical credibility 
and the comparison of propaganda with reality could be best discussed within the oppression 
frame. The wars in Chechnya, Afghanistan and, most recently, in Syria were specifically 
referred to. Rhetorical means such as dramatic choice of words or the usage of numbers and 
dates emphasized vividly the content and more important increased the credibility. 
Furthermore, the choice of speakers has an influence on the credibility. Three different types 
of speakers could be identified within the propaganda videos. These are religious and militant 
leaders as well as ordinary but authentic jihadists. Besides the charisma of the leaders, it is 
likely that the attraction of ISIS is based on the jihadists on the lower hierarchical positions 
because they can be perceived as reachable role models.  
While this study focused specifically on the North Caucasus, further research on 
radical Islamist propaganda videos can adopt the methodological approach of a frame analysis 
in order to realize a comparative case study. Research should pay more attention to East 
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Europe and Central Asia since ISIS tries to recruit in several post-Soviet regions such as the 
Balkans and states with a mainly Muslim population like Kyrgyzstan (see Bewarder; Flade 
2015). Therefore, region-specific research must be carried out in order to develop suitable 
countermeasures and strategies. It is likely that radical Islamist organizations will continue to 
challenge modern societies and emanate a strong appeal to their target groups. This is 
currently of particular relevance due to the tense security situation in Russia prior to the FIFA 
World Cup. An in-depth analysis of ideologies, organizational structures and recruitment 
strategies of radical Islamist organizations can only be beneficial for the implementation of 
effective anti-terrorist measures. 
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